We challenge the conventional definition of corruption as the 'abuse of public office for private gain', making a distinction between legal and illegal forms of corruption, and paying more attention to corporate patterns of corruption (which also affect public corruption). We undertake to identify general determinants of the pattern of legal and illegal corruption worldwide, and present a model where both corruption (modelled explicitly in the context of allocations) and the political equilibrium are endogenous. Three types of equilibrium outcomes are identified as a function of basic parameters, namely initial conditions (assets/productivity), equality, and fundamental political accountability. These equilibria are: i) an illegal corruption equilibrium, where the political elite does not face binding incentives; ii) a legal corruption equilibrium, where the political elite is obliged to incur on a cost to "deceive" the population, and, iii) a no-corruption equilibrium, where the population cannot be deceived. An integral empirical test of the model is performed, using a broad range of variables and sources. 
Introduction
Corruption has been brought throughout the last decade to an important position in the development and political economy debate/literature. It has been seen as a primary impediment to growth (e.g. Mauro, 1995, Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002) , with dramatic consequences in the developing world.
This analysis has been mainly founded on bureaucratic/public sector corruption, emphasizing in particular manifestations such as administrative bribery. This highlighting reflected the availability of cross-country indices of corruption that focus on bribery or other illegal forms of corruption, and it echoed the conceptual underpinnings of the field (which has been viewing corruption as "abuse" -necessitating an illegal act -"of public office" -a public sectorcentered definition -"for private gain") 4 .
However, it is increasingly widely accepted that corruption may arise through other less obvious forms, which may involve collusion between parties typically both from the public and private sectors, and may be legal in many countries. Legal lobbying contributions by the private sector in exchange of passage of particular legislation -biased in favor of those agents -or allocation of procurement contracts may be regarded as examples of interaction of both private and public sector representatives where the second makes use of her publicly invested power at the expense of broader public welfare.
In this context, some empirical attention has already been granted to less classical forms of appropriation of public office/policy for private purposes, not necessarily illegal, such as state capture (viewed as direct sale of public policy) and influence (as the institution of influencing public policy in exchange for votes 5 ). Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2003) assess these concepts in the context of transition countries, and conclude that, in their data, captor firms enjoyed clear private advantages in association with aggregate social costs. Hellman and Kaufmann (2004) focus on the impact of inequality in influence, which is reported to generate a self-reinforcing dynamic in which institutions are subverted.
In this paper we therefore see corruption as the use of public office/policy for private gain. But this is in the sense of complete freedom from any legalistic interpretation, as well as any shortsighted closed-public sector correspondence.
This paper aims at providing a theoretical framework and corresponding empirical test to answer the questions: "Which are the determinants of the pattern of Illegal and Legal Corruption across the world? Which channels do these determinants use?". For this purpose, we use a recently available firms survey (Executive Opinion Survey, conducted by the World Economic Forum for its Global Competitiveness Report 2004 -2005 of 104 countries, where specific questions were asked regarding illegal and legal forms of corruption.
A formal theoretical model is presented in section 2. We argue that the pattern of Legal and Illegal Corruption is defined in the context of a repeated political model with three agents, where a favor is allocated at every period by one of these agents to another, and where the loser (thought as the population) may insurrect at every period. Different equilibria are characterized as a function of fundamental parameters (initial productivity, equality, and underlying political accountability).
Section 3 presents the testable implications of the model and Section 4 offers an integrated test.
In the latter, we use a number of different empirical measures for the concepts introducedmost importantly, we use data from the survey referred above to measure Legal Corruption, a notion that has been lacking empirical measurement in the literature. We show that the model and respective parameters are, generally, consistent with the data.
A Political Economy Model of Legal and Illegal Corruption

Overview and Relation to Literature
Our theoretical model proposes a new (to the best of our knowledge) explicitly micro-founded definition of corruption: it is viewed as a collusive agreement between a part of the agents of the economy who, as a consequence, are able to swap (over time; we present a repeated game) in terms of positions of power (i.e. are able to capture, together, the allocation process of the economy). This is the idea underlying high-level corruption or "influence", and is broader than the notion of bribery, which corresponds to a particular sharing pattern of the joint payoff from the referred relationship.
The most direct and common example of this agreement we have in mind is the one where a politician has close "connections" to the private sector and both exploit such connection for mutual benefit. These two parties may exchange favors over time that "pay each other": through the allocation of specific legislation or procurement contracts (by the politician to the private sector counterpart) and earmarking political campaign funding (by the private sector connection to the politician); or simply through an explicit switch in the political power "chair" among the elite players (where every period one of them allocates the chair to the other); simple repeated bribery of politicians may also be encompassed by this notion if we think of the bribe as the "political campaign funding" itself.
This notion of corruption as arising in the explicit context of an allocation mechanism 6 is linked with that of influence in Bernheim and Whinston (1986) -who study first-price auctions -, with the work of Banerjee (1997) -who analyses mechanisms with red tape and asymmetric information -, and the already vast (but disperse) literature on collusion (between bidders) in auctions 7 .
We endogeneize corruption in the context of a political economy model 8 . We assume a population that can react to corruption by "insurrecting". This is in the sense of making the corrupt agents (whom we think of as the "elite" in our model) suffer a sufficiently high penalty. We model this penalty as generally corresponding to an aggressive overthrow (though many coups cannot be seen as implying high penalties for the ruling elite, and correspond to simple transfers of power within the elite). We are, however, aware that in many countries this penalty may take more peaceful forms: e.g. bad reputations, overturning elections, effective legalsystem penalties.
The notion of insurrection in our model is linked to Robinson's (2000, 2001) threat of revolution by the population -these authors introduced this idea in the context of the historical explanation of political transitions (e.g. democratization) in Western Europe and Latin American countries 9 .
In this context we regard Legal Corruption as arising when the elite prefers to hide corruption from the population (what we will call ahead as investments in "legal barriers"). We specifically model this as a decision of the elite to reduce the horizon of analysis of the population, which can be interpreted as undermining collective action. This entails a cost for the elite. Red tape may be seen as a good example of a device implemented by an elite to obscure allocations from the population.
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Three different equilibria (as a function of different sets of parameters) are found, characterizing a given country:
• (3 rd world) high inequality / low (initial) income implying Illegal Corruption and the initiation of insurrections; the logic being that high inequality (through the relative little power to "arm an army" by the population) and low income (through the implied diminished threat of destruction of assets by the population) imply the population does 6 In fact this is the only point of connection of our notion to the ones in the literature. 7 This goes from the classical article on bid rigging by McAfee and McMillan (1992) , to recent procurement auctions papers (e.g. Compte, Lambert-Mogiliansky and Verdier, 2000) , and to the recently established literature of repeated auctions (e.g. Hopennhayn and Skrzypacz, 2001) . 8 We see a political economy model as one where politician(s) interact with the population, with the population having the possibility of using the (formal) political instruments to affect the welfare of the politician(s). See Grossman and Helpman (1994) for a classic political economy model dealing with lobbying (aimed at endogeneizing special-interest groups political contributions in the context of a political equilibrium where the politicians' welfare depends on total contributions and voters' welfare, and the lobbies are only interested in the government's choice of policy) - Damania and Frederiksson (2000) extend that paper by using a repeated version of its model (this procedure, though parallel to ours, is aimed, in their case, at a different end: studying collusion between bidders, i.e. formation of lobbying groups). 9 These authors model political transitions as a response to a threat of social unrest by the population (one of their key assumptions). 10 Another good example of legal corruption (in our sense) is the one implied in the complex mechanisms of campaign fundraising described in the Washington Post (2004) -regarding the "Pioneer" and "Ranger" networks of the US presidential campaign: these are aimed at escaping the legal individual limits in campaign funding. The limits provide assurance to the general population, but they are in fact made irrelevant through a complex web of smaller collusive contributions.
not have the power to threat the elite with a successful insurrection (note that this is in the sense above -of imposing the threat of a high penalty), so that the elite opts for the cheapest (for them) form of corruption (illegal);
• low inequality / high (initial) income implying insurrections are not started (they would be successful otherwise and that would be too costly for the elite); o (2 nd and much of the 1 st world) if accountability (which can be represented by the price of legal barriers) is low (we think of accountability as the population's awareness of corruptible behavior by the elite), Legal Corruption arises; in this context, the elite is able, at a low price, to "confound" the population and undermine collective action; o (Nordics) if accountability is high, no corruption emerges; i.e. there is nothing the elite can do to stay in power (in a corrupt way) -a successful insurrection would surface; in other words, provided the level of awareness of the population (she cannot be confounded), not even Legal Corruption may arise.
Our theoretical analysis also presents conditions for stability of each of the above equilibrium features. In Vicente (2005) , an extension of a slightly differently-structured version of the model presented here is studied where the allocations of the model imply a certain degree of allocative efficiency: this enables deriving the conditions where inefficiency surfacesassociated with corruption 11 when contract incompleteness is higher 12 .
The Model
We assume an infinitely repeated game with observable actions and complete information populated by 3 agents in each period. These agents have exogenously drawn ability (for simplicity, constant across the players) and given initial (period 0) wealth.
2.2.a. Corruption
Every period an auction (or allocation mechanism) takes place for a good, which can be interpreted as a "favor" -this can be a procurement contract offered by the public sector, or a private sector position allocated by some lobby to a former politician 13 . Bidders submit generalized versions of bids: contract offers, corresponding to conditional (on allocations) payment patterns over time (only one contract may be in place at a time, and repeated auctions means contracts may be renegotiated). The initial auctioneer is pre-defined 14 ; all auctioneers after her are defined to be the winners of the previous period auction. We assume the due gain from winning an allocation corresponds to the respective player's ability when this agent gets to be auctioneer.
11 If a pervasive corruption context can be seen as lowering the capacity by talented people to keep their rents, then Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) also present a model where corruption is associated with inefficiency (in their words: rent-seeking/lower growth). In a model structure related to ours, Sonin (2003) presents an endogenous growth model where agents may invest in private protection of property as a theoretical foundation for persistence of a bad equilibrium with low growth rates, high inequality of income, and widespread rent-seeking. 12 This is consistent with Campante and Ferreira (2004) , who present a model of lobbying where it causes inefficiency in a context of imperfect credit. A different story -not based on corruption -is presented by Esteban and Ray (2004) to support the association of poverty and inequality with inefficiency: even a benevolent government may be confounded by lobbies whose loudness (observable) is determined by true merit and wealth. 13 In this sense, this allocation game is neutral in terms of who is the allocator and which is the favor. 14 As an initial condition, the first auctioneer's identity is given.
The loser of any auction is a special agent:
(i) the loser should be regarded as the "population", interpreted as a composite agent;
(ii) this agent's utility time span may have two horizons: 1-period utility (myopic 15 ), and the one where she has infinite utility (non-myopic). We can interpret this myopia as the inability to, for the population, to act as a whole, endogeneizing every period utility under one agent. Myopia may be inflicted by the other players, as will be specified below.
Corruption is seen here as an agreement between an auctioneer and a bidder to switch favors every period, and therefore "capture" the allocation process of the economy. Implicitly the corrupted rule in this definition is: "the population should not be excluded from allocations 16 ". Note that these agreements are a general way to represent abuse of the referred ruleencompassing instantaneous (e.g. bribery) or spanned-in-time (e.g. influence) relationships, interpreted as including public sector officials or both public and private sector representatives.
The pattern of a corrupt relationship is depicted below.
2.2.b. Legal Barriers
At the moment of deciding the winner of the auction, the auctioneer may decide to spend a proportion ϖ of the received (from other player) transferred earnings (at a period) on Legal Barriers (this amount is assumed to be wasted for simplicity). This proportion may simply take a very high value (∞) or a not too high (as defined in the main proposition below) value. In parallel, we assume this expenditure leads the third/excluded party to be made "myopic".
The ϖ parameter may then be interpreted as the ability of the population to organize itself in terms of surveillance of the allocation of power (Accountability). A real world example: in a context where freedom of the press is low (ϖ), an elite may "invest" in a pure marketing campaign (bearing the cost ϖ) in order to contributes to obscure the population on what is going on in the allocation, and therefore undermine collective action (i.e. causing myopia).
2.2.c. Insurrections
At the end of every period, the loser of the auction may start an insurrection (where insurrection is just a broad way to refer to revolution or aggressive reaction from the loser).
We assume an "insurrection function" λ(.) whose arguments are ability a (the idea being that more productivity implies a greater leverage in the destruction implied in the insurrection), and the production (value added), or ability if used to produce, in the last three periods by the population, ) (
, (as a proxy for the relative power in a violent conflict). We also assume the function λ(.) is weakly increasing in the referred arguments, 15 The intuition being that the shorter lived this agent is, the more "myopic" her actions will be. 16 We are assuming these "allocations" are political in the sense of being a consequence of general population's delegation of political power. (where k's are constants). We assume for simplicity the initial production of the population is equal to her initial wealth 17 .
This insurrection will be successful with certainty if it takes a value higher than a fixed exogenous threshold 0 > λ . Otherwise the insurrection will only be successful with a (sufficiently, for the results below) low (constant) probability. If the insurrection is successful, auctioneer and winner are eliminated and substituted by two exogenous agents with the third agent becoming the new auctioneer.
Notice that the basic parameters introduced here, as influencing the outcome of the model, are ability a (productivity) and inequality 1/α.
2.2.d. Stage Game Playing Sequence
Each period, the auction, with corresponding bidding and allocative decisions takes place at the beginning of the period. The choice by the auctioneer on legal barriers follows. The stage ends with the loser deciding for or against insurrection.
2.2.e. Payoffs
Values of ability for the current auctioneer and winner are available at the end of the period (i.e. production happens at the end of the period). Consumption by all players takes place after that as a fixed proportion (1-s), for simplicity, (with s∈]0, 1[) of the end-of-period wealth, w e . We assume contracts can be enforced -an exogenous entity is available to enforce these and act as a profitless intermediary (agents can credibly commit to future conditional transfers when "bidding/offering"). However, we assume a rigidity (contract incompleteness) is in place in the sense that only before production is realized transfers can be done to/from the entity, i.e.
(1-s) of a period production cannot be negotiated ex-ante since it has to be consumed.
The end of period wealth is given by: δ is the discount factor. We assume that i δ is always equal to δ (assumed positive, and high enough) except when i is made myopic at time t, when it takes value 0 from time t+1. 17 We also assume for simplicity that before period 2, initial wealth takes 2/3 of the weight (end of date 0) or 1/3 of the weight (end of date 1) in the alpha function. In this section, we focus on the best (in the view of the initial auctioneer) symmetric (meaning same strategies for players in the same position in the game) Sub-Game Perfect Equilibria. This may be interpreted as a sort of first-mover advantage -the asymmetric capacity to convince other players to focus on a convenient equilibrium -on the hands of the first auctioneer (the one that controls power in the first place) 18 .
Equilibrium
We begin by a simple result. 
as total consumption (payoff) from surplus x every other period starting at period y.
No insurrections assure that the initial auctioneer lives forever, which means this agent is not constrained in her actions by that insurrection threat.
Provided there is a contract incompleteness, the initial auctioneer always prefers occupying the position of auctioneer as much as possible (i.e. every other period).
From competition by the first bidding agents, the first auctioneer can extract the full surplus from being in power every other period p(a,0), and capture the full transferable surplus of the other favors, p (sa,2) . This is done by rotating in "power" forever with the second auctioneer (corruption), since any deviation from the first auctioneer would not be an equilibrium. This stems from the fact that conditionality of payments (done by the second auctioneer), in the event that the first auctioneer sticks to the agreement, will make the second auctioneer indifferent between deviating or not (she will have to lose her transferable raised surplus anyway). On the other hand if the first auctioneer deviates, the second auctioneer would prefer to make a slightly higher payoff with the third agent (she would not be constrained by the initial agreement).
Note that, this way, the second politician gets to "eat" the non-transferable part of what she raises, and third party gets zero surplus. Regarding the remaining payoff -from initial wealth -, given competition, it mainly goes to the initial auctioneer, who reaches payoff close (from above) to
(where auc represents the first auctioneer and pop represents the population 19 ) with it (note that the initial auctioneer cannot reach the initial wealth of the population provided then the second auctioneer would lose the above referred indifference; also, the second auctioneer will only "bid" enough to surpass the population, which is the population's wealth).
The described quantities (from surplus and initial wealth) then correspond to the highest payoff the initial auctioneer can make in an equilibrium of this economy without insurrections.
We are now in position to derive a more complete result. • no Insurrections are started;
• Corruption does not arise (in the sense of no pairs being constituted to hold power forever); • Legal Barriers do not arise;
• the economy stays in this equilibrium forever (Stable).
Proof (and Intuition):
Under the conditions of 1., the population is at date 0 almost powerless in terms of response through insurrection (i.e. λ is not high enough for the third party to pose a nontrivial threat in terms of successful insurrection at the first period -if started, it is successful with sufficiently low probability). Assume this is the case forever. This means the initial auctioneer will behave the same way as described in the Lemma since the expected cost of insurrections is close to zero and therefore lower than the cost of making an agreement with the population on allocations or spending on legal barriers (assuming these would prevent the initiation of insurrections -see below). In this context initiating insurrections is indeed the best response from the population. The initial auctioneer will therefore be able to extract ex-ante approximately, from below (provided the third party is now initiating insurrections at every period), all the payoff characterized in the Lemma.
Note that, in this equilibrium, before the population gets a successful insurrection, inequality never decreases (since the population does not get favors and therefore does not get to use her ability). This means, with very high probability (provided a successful insurrection happens with sufficiently low probability), the population will remain having sufficiently low probability of success in an insurrection throughout the game.
Under 2., the population has the power to successfully insurrect (at least initially), and therefore impose incentives on the first auctioneer.
In a., the leading pair of 1. still has an opportunity to stay in power indefinitely through every-period 21 investments in Legal Barriers. Under the described investments, the population indeed poses no threat (does not start insurrections): she does not gain from the successful insurrection provided the corresponding gain happens outside the span of her life (she is indifferent between starting an insurrection or not). For the leading pair, this represents an inferior (relative to 1.) payoff, because of the non-trivial waste ϖ. However, because of not "too high" 22 ϖ (assumed), it is worth implementing.
This equilibrium pattern may imply a convergence to the equilibrium pattern of 1 (where the population loses her threatening power) -note that, as for 1., the population value added is weakly decreasing; however, if α k is high enough (in practice this is equivalent to consider the insurrection function as not depending on α ), even with the referred weakly decreasing value added, no change in the equilibrium pattern would arise (stability would be maintained).
Finally, under b., high institutional awareness of the population (ϖ=∞) makes investments in Legal Barriers not an option. This means the third party is not myopic. Remember that agents value highly enough the future in the utility function (sufficiently high discount factor). Consider the situation where the population initiates insurrections at the end of the second period without receiving the favor (since next period, given insurrection function arguments, she may lose the initial advantage in terms of insurrection capacity on the average last-periods surplus side). This implies the favor will go to her at that time. This strategy by the population corresponds to the lowest payoff the she has to be guaranteed every three periods (provided we assume a symmetric equilibrium, so that all agents behave in the same way when at the same position 23 ). Note that given the insurrection option all bidders offer nothing at all periods (indifferently). This implies the best equilibrium for the initial auctioneer, under these assumptions, encompasses a rotation in power of the three agents with no insurrections initiated and 21 Note that, even in the periods where the second auctioneer is in power it is the first auctioneer who sees his payoff diminished by the cost of legal barriers. 22 See the end of the proof for a precise meaning. 23 Namely, the population as new auctioneer after a successful insurrection. If initial inequality is low enough (so that the fact that the leading pair gets the first productivities can be balanced in terms of inequality) and a rotation of the three agents is the equilibrium, then, inequality stays constant over time; this implies this is a stable equilibrium.
A final note regards defining the "not too high" ϖ: It is such that
Testable Implications
In the light of the model and in the view of its empirical counterpart, we interpret Corruption without investments in Legal Barriers as Illegal Corruption, and Corruption together with investments in Legal Barriers as Legal Corruption. 25 The above model aims primarily at fitting the empirical facts on legal, illegal and lack of corruption (as for the three types of equilibria we present) irrespectively of efficiency considerations 26 . It proposes three kinds of exogenous factors (Ability or Productivity, Inequality, and Accountability) in the determination of insurrections and of the levels of the above different kinds of corruption.
We summarize the testable implications of Proposition 1 in the following In the final part of the paper, additional data on Rule of Law will be used in order to adjust the above crude empirical measures of Legal Corruption: a question on Frequency of Bribery in Judicial Decisions (EOS Q5.12G) and the Rule of Law Indicator from KKM.
• (Beck et al, 2001 ).
All the referred variables and respective sources are described in detail in the Appendix, Part I.
Simple Empirical Tests: Averages and Correlations
We begin by presenting (Table 2 33 below) averages of the endogenous variables (corruption and insurrections) for the two basic parameters, Ability (Productivity) and Equality.
Two main types of conclusions can be derived from their observation (numbers in bold):
• the differences of lower to upper (in terms of GDP or equality, by looking at first quartile versus the other quartiles or by looking at first half versus the second) groups of countries are clearly lower for Legal Corruption, than for Illegal Corruption; this is consistent with the first two rows (concerning endogenous variables) of Table 1 ; • insurrection proxies are higher in lower GDP or equality groups of countries (by looking at any of its proposed measures), which is consistent with the third row (concerning endogenous variables) in Table 2 .
We can also see, from the observation of Table 2 , that there seems to have a more significant difference in the variables in the ratios by first quartile/remaining quartiles than by halves (with the exception of equality by Gini, which anyway does not embody any notable divergence). We will focus on the first division (using quartiles). 31 The presented coefficient is given by 100-Gini in order to capture an equality scale. 32 Data from these indicators were transformed to low accountability (low number) -high accountability (high number). 33 Data on KKM in the table were transformed to the scale 1(good)-7(bad). Data on EOS Q5.09 go from 1(good) to 7(bad), on iJET go from 1(good) to 5(bad), on EIU go from 0(good) to 4(bad).
We now focus on the two first rows (concerning endogenous variables) and the first three columns of 14D -KKMCC) . The last three pairs were made comparable by transforming both scales to the respective percentile ranks 35 . Note that the lowest Legal Corruption countries (as given by the respective Legal Corruption variable) were taken out of the sample for the correlations shown in the graphs 36 . We depict below, for illustration, the Procurement-related difference (in the Appendix, Part II, we show the other graphs).
Concerning the third row (Insurrections) we present in the Appendix (Part III) the plots of Travel Risk iJET and of Common Crime with both GDP and Equality (as given by EOS Q7.10): clear negative correlations arise.
Finally some attention should be devoted to the third family of exogenous variables: Accountability. In the Appendix, Part IV, we plot Legal Corruption (as given by the three 34 Although in this sub-section, only EOS Q7.10 -Inequality in Healthcare is shown as a proxy for inequality, Gini was also tried with similar results. 35 KKM Control of Corruption was transformed to the order "good" to "bad". 36 However, they are not very different from the full sample correlations -there is not a generalizeable pattern of the difference between full and partial correlations. variables already mentioned) against Accountability (represented by Press Freedom from EOS and Freedom House, and by Civil Liberties from Freedom House) -we present graphs for Favoritism in Procurement (EOS Q4.12) versus Press Freedom (EOS Q5.06) below as an illustration. Note that overall correlations are provided. In addition, for the Press Freedom from EOS, graphs identifying the first GDP and Equality quartiles are showed with respective correlations; with respect to the other Accountability proxies, only Equality is used; concerning Civil Liberties, the sub-sample correlations are not showed provided there is very low variation in this variable, which is discrete, for the referred quartiles). From the observation of these graphs we can conclude there are clearly higher correlations of Legal Corruption with lack of Accountability for the referred quartiles -in fact, with the exception of a small group of countries, we detect a negatively sloped overall pattern 37 : this is totally consistent with the first row in Table 1 . 
An Econometric Model for an Integrated Test:
We now present a linear econometric (structural) model aimed at testing the above theoretical implications in an integrated manner. We take three equations for each of our main endogenous variables ( where DGDP is the dummy of GDP per capita (taking value one for GDP per capita in the first quartile of its distribution), DEQUAL is the dummy of the variable for Equality (taking value one for Equality in the first quartile of its distribution), and DACC is the dummy for Accountability (taking value one for Accountability in the first quartile of its distribution). Note that the exogenous variables concerning GDP refer to an earlier period (compared with the endogenous variables): this is an extra safeguard in order to guarantee exogeneity is not lost in data for Productivity.
The predictions of the model lead to the following restrictions on coefficients: Equation (1):
However, since our focus is on testing and not on estimation of particular coefficients, we run the three regressions without any endogenous explanatory variables -as a reduced form of the above model. In doing so, we assume the endogenous channels are unimportant in defining the signs on the exogenous variables 38 so that we can test the model by testing for the emergence of the signs presented above (for each equation).
Econometric Practice and Results
Provided a very close correlation of Legal and illegal Corruption proxies, a special procedure was pursued with respect to the equation regarding Legal Corruption. We use for estimation, as the proxies for Legal Corruption, difference of the crude Legal Corruption variables we presented above to Illegal Corruption variables (Frequency of Bribery in Procurement -EOS Q5.12E, and KKM Control of Corruption) and to Rule of Law variables (Frequency of Bribery in Judicial Decisions -EOS Q.5.12G, and KKM Rule of Law) 39 . By doing so, we try to isolate the relevant part (for the idea in the theoretical model) of Legal Corruption 40 -i.e. we try to have it free of its illegality-related measuring component.
The variables used in the regressions were, for the endogenous variables, the ones already mentioned with the following exceptions: Frequency of Bribery in Procurement (EOS Q5.12E) was only used to contrast Favoritism in Policy and Procurement (EOS 4.12) provided its very specific scope; the Civil War variable was not used provided its binary representation 41 . For the exogenous variables we show results for all variables presented above.
The results are presented in the tables below.
Note that for each different combination of empirical proxies, we choose the best (in terms of R Squared Adjusted) specification from three: with both crossing terms for GDP and Equality (i.e. both crossed with Accountability), only with the crossing term regarding GDP, and only with the crossing term concerning Equality 42 . We always try each of the crossing terms alone, provided the high (by construction) correlation between these two variables.
Looking at these results, and using a classification where "EXACT" corresponds to an exact fit of the predictions of the model and "OK" corresponds to a fit of the signs only (where significance fails to fit the model 43 ), we can conclude that:
38 This is the most reasonable assumption given the fact that the model is silent with respect to causality within endogenous variables. 39 Note that we have chosen one variable from the same EOS database and one from an external source (KKM). 40 Note that in the model, when we have Legal Corruption we do not have Illegal Corruption and vice versa. 41 This representation does not yield (using Probit) useful results in the dummy specification used -collinearity is too strong. 42 For completion, whenever we show a second regression for the same combination of variables, this was a regression for which an exact fit arises (of the signs predicted by the model), but with an inferior R2 Adjusted. 43 Note that the criterion used for "OK" is more stringent for Equation (1) • Equations (2) and (3) seem to fit the model quite well -Equation (2) has 17 "EXACT" and 19 "OK" out of 50, and Equation (3) has 22 "EXACT" and 38 "OK" out of 60 (these correspond, together, to the whole set of regressions performed); Equation (1) using the referred differences also fits the data, though with more apparent limitations: it has 14 "EXACT" and 51 "OK" out of 100 regressions.
• For Equation (1) • For Equation (3), Common Crime (EOS Q5.09) performs slightly better than the other proxies in terms of yielding the signs predicted by the model; Gini and the EOS measure achieve akin results; as for the last equation, DPI Fractionalization of Government performs specially well with almost all exact fits.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has suggested a set of simple hypothesis to explain the pattern of Legal and Illegal Corruption across the world. These assumptions were tested and some convincing results of their validity arose. However, we are aware that this is the beginning of a long journey, and that more structured answers to our research question should be pursued.
We mainly added the following to the literature:
• A political economy model where corruption is endogeneized, making use of the idea that the population has available a threat of insurrection; in the model, legal corruption arises in the context of investments in legal barriers aimed to undermine collective action on the part of the population.
• A new corruption concept not constrained by public-sector, illegality restrictions; corruption is seen as a deal between people for the exchange of favors over time (in the most appealing example two agents, one from the private sector, the other from the public sector, trade favors over time, with the public sector agent making use of her public office investment).
• An empirical focus on Legal Corruption is embraced, using a newly available database (Executive Opinion Survey 2004 for the Global Competitiveness Report), with precise questions on this kind of practice.
In terms of policy implications of this work, we would like to stress some messages that follow from our exercise.
First we are convinced that the policy focus when analyzing the prevalence of corruption (both conceptually and empirically) should not overlook the private sector as a key player in the determination of corruption outcomes.
Second, it is clear from the analysis of the data that many rich countries (G7 and OECD members) seem to be challenged cases in what legal corruption is concerned. We have tried to argue that conceptually legal corruption may be quite close to its illegal counterpart (though there is work to do in terms of determining its relative impact on the economy).
We have also found that fundamental accountability may a clear role in development. This may be a key variable in the determination of corruption in richer societies -policies oriented to its reinforcement may be very fruitful.
Finally, we would like to underline that under the equilibria with corruption, it is clear that the lack of internal (to the economy or, broadly speaking, to a given country) incentives on the political elite is the force causing the emergence of corruption. In that sense, we would like to convey the message that exogenous interventions may be necessary on the referred incentives if one wants to diminish the prevalence of corruption. In other words, although we argue the main determinants of the situation are fundamental (initial productivity, equality, underlying political accountability), we think we have presented a framework that is compatible with direct intervention in incentives of politicians by external agents. A very interesting possible extension of the model presented is surely one where external aid is endogeneized -and that may improve the fit of the model to the data. 
